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I. Introduction
There is a voluminous theoretical and empirical literature
about the implications of alternative trade regimes for economic
development, which on balance points out that export-oriented
strategies provide the most appropriate framework of economic
incentives conducive to sustained and rapid growth along with an
efficient use of available resources including indigenous labour
[see, for instance, the surveys by Balassa, 1980a; Donges, 1983;
and Krueger, 1984a]. Accordingly, an increasing number of devel-
oping countries have linked, to varying degrees, their economies
to world production on the basis of comparative advantage and, by
doing so, they were transformed into the now "newly industrializ-
ing countries" (NJICs) . South Korea is one of the outstanding
cases in point, and Dr. Jae-Ik Kim, in whose memory the present
essay is written, shared firmly the notion of international spe-
cialization, adhering to it also when the world economic environ-
ment sharply deteriorated during the seventies.
Yet, many governments of developing countries (and some
influential academic economists as well) remained sceptical to-
*
Prepared for a book in memory of Jae-Ik Kim (The Liberalization
Process in Economic Development, ed. by Lawrence Krause and
Kihwan Kim).- 2 -
wards the implementation of outward-oriented trade regimes. The
standard argument is that, after a long-lasting inward-oriented
economic development, based on import substitution policies for
industrialization, trade liberalization would cause excessively
high adjustment costs while the potential benefits from such a
liberalization could only be small, if not negligible, in an
unfavourable international economic environment as the present
one. That some South American countries which embarked upon libe-
ralization experiments during the seventies fell into deep eco-
nomic recessions, often accompanied by social and political up-
heavals, provide convenient support to such anxieties, despite
pervasive evidence to the contrary in Asian countries. There are
also instances, again mainly in Latin America, in which govern-
ments, faced with pressing foreign exchange needs to service
foreign debt, undid prior shifts to relatively outward-oriented
trade regimes and readopted import-substitution strategies.
The purpose of this essay is to re-assess the case of out-
ward-oriented trade regimes in the process of economic develop-
ment. The nature of outward-orientation is briefly explained in
the next section. As developing countries usually start their in-
dustrialization through import substitution strategies, the shift
from an inward- to an outward-oriented trade regime raises ques-
tions concerning the set of economic policies to be reshaped, the
timing of the policy reform, and the feasibility of such changes,
which all are discussed in the third section. The fourth section
provides evidence on successful as well as on unsuccessful liber-
alization attempts undertaken in the seventies and traces the- 3 -
causes for success or failure by relating the country experiences
to the policy framework for export liberalization outlined in the
previous section. In the fifth section, the revival of export
pessimism is evaluated.
II. Essence of an Outward-looking Strategy
Export promotion and outward-oriented trade regimes have
frequently been misinterpreted to be policies which deliberately
promote exports over other economic activities and beyond the
level attainable under free trade conditions [see, for instance,
Streeten, 1982], The crucial point to be made is that government
incentives to industrialization should be compatible with an
optimal allocation of resources to the largest extent possible
[as elaborated in the rejoinders to Streeten by Henderson, 1982,
and Balassa, 1983],
This is not the case when the trade regime is biased towards
import substitution on the basis of a variety of trade barriers
ranging from high tariffs and restrictive quotas to outright
import bans. Too many resources are then attracted by the pro-
tected industries. Moreover, as the process of import substitu-
tion goes on, encompassing the production of intermediate and
investment goods, the incremental capital-output ratio will rise,
which is likely to affect adversely the rate of economic growth
and thereby to lead to a vicious circle of generally lower saving
and investment paths and weakening productivity and development- 4 -
trends. Export activities are, in the absence of corrective meas-
ures, discriminated against. On the one hand, exporters have to
pay higher prices for protected locally produced or imported
inputs, which they cannot pass on to potential customers on the
world market unless they have a monopoly power (which is unlikely
for most developing countries); on the other hand, the exchange
rate tends to be over-valued due to protection, which is a self-
inflicted export obstacle par excellence.
The allocation of resources would be more efficient and
economic growth more sustainable if there is a framework of in-
centives which frees producers of exportables from cost disadvan-
tages vis-a-vis foreign producers. As long as some import pro-
tection is granted on the grounds of non-pecuniary dynamic exter-
nalities, exporters have to be compensated by some forms of sub-
sidies and by duty-free import allowances, as will be discussed
below. Subsidies constitute a drain on government budgets which
provides a stimulus to policy makers to refrain from excessive
export promotion, to maintain a realistic exchange rate as an
alternative to public subsidies, and to keep import protection at
moderate levels. By contrast, import substitution strategies have
revealed built-in tendencies towards reinforcing the inward bias
of the incentive system [Bhagwati, 1978; Donges, 1983:280-282;
Krueger, 1983a:32-33]. Import-substituting industries replace
less imports than additionally required as intermediate inputs or
for investment purposes, thus aggravating existing or giving rise
to new balance-of-payments problems. Growing current account
deficits as well as the exhaustion of narrow domestic markets by- 5 -
the newly established industries put pressure on governments to
implement additional trade restrictions and to intervene in for-
eign exchange, capital and labour markets, thereby further pena-
lizing export activities.
Disregarding externalities, an optimal allocation of re-
sources requires that the domestic rate of transformation equals
the international rate of transformation. Taking international
prices as given (small country assumption), the ratio of relative
domestic prices of importables and exportables over the respec-
tive world market prices must be unity [Krueger, 1978], Then, the
system of incentives is neutral with respect to sales in domestic
or in world markets. It is in this sense, and only in this, that
the export promotion strategy is differentiated from an import-
substitution strategy. Export promotion strategies provide incen-
tives to exports sufficient to compensate for the discrimination
of export production inherent in import protection; they provide
a uniform incentive to both import-substitution and exports and
thus to saving and earning foreign exchange per unit of domestic
resources used; but they do not aim at boosting exports beyond
free trade levels. The emphasis is on specialization based on
comparative advantage, not on export expansion per se.
In cases in which the private costs of export production are
higher than the social costs and this positive externality is
higher than the corresponding externalities associated with im-
port substitution, a bias of the incentive system in favour of
exports could be justified on economic grounds [Mayer, 1984], The- 6 -
general problem with the "infant-industry" argument is, however,
that it may turn out to be very difficult in practice to accura-
tely demonstrate the existence of significant externalities and,
if this was possible, to discontinue the extra-subsidies to ex-
porting (or the protection of import substitutes) later on when
the assisted activities have become mature.
III. The Framework for Export Liberalization
III-l. Economic Objectives
The outward oriented trade regime aims at promoting sus-
tained economic development and a rapid process of industriali-
zation by exposing the domestic economy to international com-
petition. The objectives are to improve the allocative efficiency
of the economy as a whole by bringing, at each instant, the
structure of production in line with the country's comparative
advantage and to reap irreversible external benefits from the
exploitation of economies of scale through exports, the stabili-
zation of export earnings through export diversification into
manufactured goods, the increase of savings for investment
through raising real incomes, and the acceleration of technolog-
ical innovation and human capital formation through competition
from, and contacts with, abroad. Such gains are foregone in an
inward-oriented trade regime since import protection and the
whole system of market regulations do not only discriminate
against exports, distort the structure of production and make it
rigid, but also cause losses in efficiency through cartelization,- 7 -
rent seeking behaviour, the formation of a labour aristocracy and
the expansion of bureaucracy.
Export liberalization entails the two tasks of substituting
price signals for administrative controls and of adjusting domes-
tic relative prices to international relative prices, either by
gradual measures or shock treatment. Liberalization does not
necessarily mean the implementation of free trade and non-inter-
vention in all other markets; it rather means a reform of econom-
ic policies, so that the price mechanism can work more effective-
ly and competition is less distorted . Government measures to
remove market failures are perfectly justified, provided that
such market imperfections are real (non-pecuniary externalities,
publicness in goods or services, natural monopolies, and the
like) and not the result of excessive encroachment of public
authorities into the market process [as it so often happens, see
Krueger, 1983:Chapter 7]. A liberalization reform requires ad hoc
measures to be replaced by a stable and foreseeable policy frame-
work, uniform rather than selective interventions, and a return
to price flexibility which allows for a proper response to market
changes. What does this mean in detail? The answer will differ
between countries, depending much on the nature of the inward-
oriented trade regime which has been in force so far. The common
characteristics of an inward-oriented trade regime may therefore
provide an appropriate starting point for a discussion of essen-
tial elements of a reform package.
The economically successful Asian NICs, which have not abstain-
ed from a substantial degree of government intervention in
their development process, may serve as illustration.- 8 -
III-2. Inadequacies of the Inward-oriented Policy Regime
Once a country embarks on an import-substitution stratgegy
there seems to be a logic to the evolution of direct government
controls on prices and quantities over time [Bhagwati, 1978],
Initial tariff protection for "infant industries" soon proves to
be insufficient as non-protected domestic as well as discrimi-
nated export sectors vehemently complain about unfair treatment
and as protection creates an incentive to evade the regime via
smuggling, over- and underinvoicing, or black market transac-
tions. The public authorities tend to react by moving from tariff
protection to quantitative controls and import licencing proce-
dures, effected with ever-increasing product coverage and ever-
finer selectivity, yielding to political pressures of (often
disparate) sectional interest groups. When easy import substitu-
tion possibilites have been exhausted, but the inward-looking
policy approach is maintained, a complex control network is like-
ly to evolve encompassing direct import allocation by category of
commodity, by type of domestic uses, and by source of foreign ex-
change .
Despite proliferating import controls, import substitution
regimes will generally not come to grips with the balance-of-
payments difficulties, which typically afflict developing coun-
tries. As industrialization proceeds, the demand for imported
intermediates and capital goods, which are complementary to dom-
estic production, continues to grow at high rates, while the
policy-induced over-valuation of the national currency retards or- 9 -
impedes export expansion. Rising trade deficits and subsequent
shortages of foreign exchange make interventions in foreign ex-
change markets inevitable and the resort to external credits a
pressing need. Hence, import controls are supplemented by a di-
rect allocation of foreign exchange to domestic uses and, also,
complemented by an administrative credit rationing.
Capital market interventions usually emerge from two
sources. Firstly, import substitution policies, making for un-
limited vertical diversification of the industrialization pro-
cess, favour production of relatively capital-intensive products,
the application of capital-intensive technologies (because of
relatively low barriers to imports of capital goods), and an
inefficient use of capital (due to the lack of competition in
domestic markets). High incremental capital-output ratios would
soon slow down industrialization and economic growth unless
access to financial capital at reasonable rates of interest can
be maintained. To sustain the momentum of import substitution,
governments will, therefore, impose interest rate ceilings on
both deposits and loans and/or provide preferential treatment for
selected economic activities - as it actually occurred time and
again. As these interventions usually are administered in a dis-
cretionary way, they create uncertainty among investors; and as
they tend to be guided by public preferences rather than by com-
parative advantages, investment patterns are likely to be dis-
torted. In addition, interest rate and other subsidies to capital
formation become an increasing burden to the public budget.- 10 -
Secondly, interest rate ceilings on bank deposits discourage
domestic private savings and encourage - together with the over-
valued exchange rate - capital flight, both augmenting demand for
external funds. Reflecting donor rules or preferences for secur-
ing external financing by government guaranties, loans from ab-
road might largely be channeled through public institutions,
which reinforces the heavy hand of the government in the alloca-
tion of credit. Foreign borrowing is, however, not an unlimited
source for financing public budget deficits. Government which are
not able (or not willing) to reduce the deficits may be tempted
to turn the screw of the inflation tax by accelerating the rate
of growth of money supply. To collect the inflation tax the bank-
ing sector has to be exposed to tighter supervision of the cen-
tral bank. High non-interest-bearing reserve requirements on bank
deposits, forced lending to public sector enterprises and, ulti-
mately, nationalization of private banks are tools to make sure
that the inflation tax accrues to the government, but these tools
further weaken the functioning of the capital market.
Import protection and the availability of credit at subsi-
dized interest rates promote expansion of capital-intensive lines
of production and, thereby, boost labour productivity at the
expense of creating sufficient employment opportunities to absorb
a rapidly growing labour force. The distorted structure of pro-
duction paves the way to nominal wage levels in excess of equi-
librium wages in the formal sector of the economy with the well-
known consequences for labour migration and informal labour mar-
kets. The situation worsens if governments pursuing inward-- 11 -
oriented development strategies do keep wages above their equili-
brium levels by minimum wage legislation and if they artificially
increase labour costs to employers further by excessively rigid
labour codes and generous social policies. Such interventions in
fact occurred in many developing countries [Squire, 1981; Berry,
Sabot, 1984]. They were meant to secure the political support of
the - in most cases well organized - urban labour force for the
development strategy applied by the government. For this reason,
governments also sought to shelter the urban labour force from
the costs derived from high inflation through price controls for
essential consumer goods, publicly decreed wage increases and/or
formal indexation of wages. Thus, labour markets become subject
to a significant degree of government regulations and controls as
inward oriented economic development progresses over time, and
comparative advantages based on a relatively elastic supply of
labour are not exploited.
It is against such a background, i.e. an economic environ-
ment characterized by manifold interrelated and distorting gov-
ernment interventions in the economy, that export liberalization
has to be contemplated. Attempts to liberalize the economy have
to take into account the nature of controls and regulations as
well as the interactions between them. Welfare theory suggests
that in a case of multiple distortions removal of one distortion
may make things even worse. Export liberalization will, there-
fore, require a reform package which includes some degree of
policy change vis-a-vis all major markets.- 12 -
III-3. What Policy Reform Package?
From a theoretical point of view, export liberalization
would best be achieved by an instantaneous removal of all con-
trols and regulations which, distort the allocation of resources
and contribute to an underutilization of available capacity. Such
a first best solution is, however, likely not to be feasible in
the context of a highly regulated economy since adjustment costs
may become excessively high and even disrupt the political system
as such. A more cautious approach to liberalization raises a
number of questions such as which are the key markets to be lib-
eralized, which degree of deregulation is both necessary and
feasible, and which timing and sequencing of policy changes
should be envisaged.
Under a fixed exchange rate system, import liberalization
can reduce the bias of trade policies in favour of import sub-
stitution and may have a beneficial effect on inflation rates. It
may, yet, fail to achieve the desired export expansion as long as
capital- and labour markets remain under tight control. Export
prices do not change because of the fixed exchange rate. Although
intermediate input costs decline as a result of import liberal-
ization, labour costs remain high, and artificially low capital
costs due to interest rate ceilings provide little incentive to
redirect investment flows toward export activities which usually
yield a higher capital productivity than import substitution. A
devaluation of the currency would appear to be more promising
than import liberalization with respect to export expansion,MbMothek das j
fa ^foltwirtodiafl WM - 13 -
since, even with quantitative import controls persisting, the
relative domestic price of exportables would increase. This re-
sult depends, however, very much on how the necessary exchange-
rate adjustment is effected. In the presence of high rates of
inflation, the authorites may underestimate the difference be-
tween domestic and international inflation and thus cause a real
appreciation of the exchange rate rather than a depreciation. But
even a freely floating exchange rate and a liberalization of the
foreign exchange market can have its draw-backs unless domestic
financial markets are simultaneously liberalized. For, in the
presence of controlled (and usually negative) interest rates,
full liberalization of the exchange regime for both current and
capital account and a floating exchange rate would surely result
in capital outflows and rapid depreciation of the currency in
excess of the rate of inflation. In countries with high and per-
sistent inflation, a complete deregulation of financial markets
will, however, hardly be feasible (at least not in the short run)
since the tightly controlled banking sector has lost the capabi-
lity to collect and allocate financial resources efficiently.
Obviously, there are no cookbook recipes for initiating the
transition from an inward to an outward oriented trade regime.
Level of development, size of the country, resource endowment,
and relative importance of controls in individual markets will
have to be taken into account when designing an effective and
feasible reform package. However, empirical evidence strongly
suggests that ^trade interventions have-been ' a^ma-jor-,-- i £ ..
biggest single source of distortion [Krueger, 1984b:417],- 14 -
For this reason, it is a safe proposition that any policy
reform will have to focus on the removal of obstacles to an ex-
pansion of__expp_r.ts,...in....the...fijrsjt place. Depending on the nature
and degree of protection, a combination of the following three
elements of an import liberalization strategy will have to be
applied to accomplish this task: a transformation of quantitative
trade interventions into tariffs, harmonization of tariff protec-
tion across sectors, and a reduction of the average level of pro-
tection. As to the first aspect, tariffs are preferable to quan-
titative restrictions not only because the latter tend to veil
the actual degree of protection but also because the competition
for import licenses diverts productive resources from more effi-
cient use elsewhere in the economy, apart from encouraging cor-
ruption in the bureaucracy . Secondly, remolding the (new) tar-
iff structure towards a uniform tariff system serves the purpose
to eliminate or at least reduce escalation and de-escalation
effects of selective nominal tariff protection on effective rates
of protection. A more uniform effective rate of protection across
sectors lowers artificial advantages for import-substituting
activities through, for instance, duty-free imports of capital
goods, and leaves the choice of efficient import substitution
possibilities to market forces rather than to bureaucrats. Third-
ly, a more uniform tariff system in itself usually entails a
lower overall degree of import protection to domestic industries,
since those sectors which were granted low protection in the past
will now exert pressures on the government to treat the other
The beneficial effects of phasing out quantitative restrictions
on imports have recently been shown in Turkey [GSnensay, 1984].- 15 -
activities equally. Obstacles to the expansion of exports are
thus mitigated. However, additional efforts will be required if
the general level of protection is to be lowered further .
As long as some degree of import protection prevails, export
activities remain discriminated against both directly through
higher prices for imported intermediate and capital goods and
indirectly through the effects of protection on the general level
of product and factor prices. Direct cost disadvantages of export
activities can be remedied by one or all of the following mea-
sures, which have been applied in a wide range of developing
countries: duty-free importation of inputs for export production,
draw-back schemes for import tariffs, and the establishment of
free export-processing zones. From the point of view of admini-
strative ease, duty-free importation and export-processing zones
are clearly superior to draw-back schemes while free zones - if
appropriately established - may offer additional net benefits in
terms of employment creation and strengthened linkages to the
domestic economy [Spinanger, 1984].
A closer vertical integration of the economy is also pro-
moted by measures compensating export activities for indirect
cost disadvantages. Such measures include income or sales tax
rebates, special depreciation allowances, preferential credits
(Chile/ where the government removed quotas and reduced tariffs
Vfrom^an average level of 90 per cent in 1974 to a uniform rate
oflO per cent in 1979, following a pre-announced time sche-
dule, is the most recent case in point proving that a trade
liberalization policy is feasible despite the opposition of
vested interests [Sjaastad, 1983],- 16 -
and straightforward subsidies [for details see de Wulf, 1978],
These various kinds of subsidies on either output or factor use
can be compared to a partial, export related devaluation of the
currency which may be neccessary to balance the incentive system
with respect to sales in domestic and foreign markets. However,
this approach bears some risks: Firstly, it is almost impossible
to determine the subsidy rate required to compensate for disad-
vantages accruing from import protection which may lead to an
undesirable overshooting. Secondly, the subsidies, typically
related to the amount of investment, tend to encourage the use of
capital over labour and, thus, may be detrimental to a satis-
factory rate of employment growth. And thirdly, export subsidies
can provoke retaliation from industrialized countries which tend
to ignore the compensatory nature of these subsidies, regarding
them as price dumping. For these reasons, the emphasis of trade
policy reform should be on import liberalization rather than on
the implementation of export subsidies.
With import liberalization, the compensation of indirect
cost disadvantages can be achieved by a more rational exchange
rate policy which increases the prices of exportables without in-
flating import prices. In the medium and long term, exchange rate
policy has to neutralize differences between domestic and foreign
rates of inflation to shelter domestic suppliers from inflation-
induced cost disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign competitors. This
goal cannot be achieved if the exchange rate is used as a policy
instrument to influence other macro-economic variables as well,
such as the rate of inflation itself. If the exchange rate is- 17 -
used to break the inflation mentality, as was done for instance
in Chile in 1979-81, this is at best a short-term policy the
success of which depends on the credibility of the governments
1
effort to contain inflation and on the ability of the export
sector to cope with the temporary discrimination implied by the
real appreciation of the currency. The choices for an appropriate
medium-term exchange rate policy are ad hoc devaluations in an
otherwise fixed exchange rate system, the implementation of a
sliding peg or a pre-announced devaluation schedule, or a freely
floating exchange rate. The first alternative can be dismissed as
impracticable both on theoretical and empirical grounds. In a
fixed exchange rate system, the external value of the currency is
adjusted ex post to inflation differences. This in itself con-
tributes to permanently fluctuating real exchange rates which
discourages export orientation of domestic firms, is detrimental
to long range investment planning, and induces destabilizing
speculation. These negative effects are aggravated if necessary
devaluations are delayed on account of ill-fated national pre-
stige considerations, as frequently occurs, so that further un-
certainty is caused.
The choice between administered stepwise devaluations and
freely floating exchange rates is a much more difficult one be-
cause the potential effects on resource allocation of either
policy depends on monetary and credit policies pursued simultan-
eously. A controlled sliding peg has the advantage of levelling
exchange rate fluctuations and, hence, reduces exchange rate
risks for exporters and local as well as foreign investors. Coun-- 18 -
tries such as Brazil, Colombia and South Korea have successfully
applied such a policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s [Donges,
Miiller-Ohlsen, 1978:112], Problems have been encountered, how-
ever, with pre-announced stepwise devaluations ("tablita") in
some Latin American countries with high and increasing rates of
inflation such as Argentina and Uruguay [for details, see Bar-
letta, Blejer, Landau, 1984]. In these countries, the "tablita"
has repeatedly failed to bring about the desired devaluation of
the currency in real terms in the second half of the 1970s and
early 1980s, since governments usually underestimated future
rates of inflation. The result was a real appreciation of the
currency since nominal devaluation rates fell short of inter-
national inflation differences. The lesson is that a "tablita"
policy will only help to restore foreign exchange equilibrium if
governments simultaneous Jy pursue,,,, .a.,, .^sS^.Sjf^..^X^J^ir^J^^i!^n^Y
monetary policy which usually implies incisive cuts of public
deficits [Sjaastad, 1983; Fischer, Hiemenz, Trapp, 1985]. In
order to alleviate short-term adjustment costs as much as
possible, anti-inflationary policies will have to be accompanied
by financial policies designed to enhance the restructuring of
the economy according to comparative advantages, a topic to which
we will return shortly.
The other alternative, the transition from a fixed over-val-
ued to a freely floating exchange rate will usually imply a large
initial devaluation with a similar rise in the price level which
is difficult to contain by import liberalization measures, at
least in the short term. Moreover, with low or negative real- 19 -
rates of interest in local capital markets, devaluation expecta-
tions are likely to give rise to an uncontrollable capital out-
flow, which would further reduce*^fo* capacity of the economy to
adjust to new relative prices. Yet, a freely floating exchange
rate may be the only feasible policy alternative as long as high
inflation has not abated, since governments lack the foresight to
predict future price increases correctly in an inflationary en-
vironment .
It thus seems clear that appropriate,. t^ade._.,pp.l.icsie.f_. .have, to
be combined with fiscal ^A
 m.
o.
n.®£3£y^jDpljLjcies designed to curb
inflation, and with a ,derjerg;ulat.ipn^p^ if
the shift to an outward-oriented trade regime is to succeed. The
deregulation of capital markets gains particular significance
once the adjustment process is considered. With greater reliance
on market forces and increased competition from abroad, parts of
the installed capacity will be rendered obsolete, while expansion
into new profitable activities creates demand for credit to fi-
nance the necessary investment. The ease and the speed of the
adjustment process will heavily depend on whether this demand for
fresh funds can be met. Therefore, efforts have to be undertaken
to mobilize domestic savings and to attract capital from abroad.
In both respects it is imperative to let interest rates reflect
the true scarcity of financial capital, i.e. to allow for a pos-
itive real rate of interest, and to strengthen the ability of the
banking sector to attract and allocate funds efficiently by re-- 20 -
moving excessive banking regulation . In some countries it may
also be necessary to revamp investment legislation so that exist-
ing "red tape" is reduced and foreign investors get guaranteed
their property rights, which is much more important than the
provision of generous financial incentives by the host govern-
ment, as all available evidence indicates.
Efficient capital market policies are crucial, since the
social acceptability of liberalization hinges on swift achieve-
ments in terms of output growth and employment creation. It need
not be stressed that such achievements do not only depend on con-
sistency between trade, monetary, and credit policies, as pointed
out earlier; it is of equal importance that governments do not
erode the potentially beneficial effects of the new incentive
system by countervailing policy action such as, in particular,
controls of prices, profits and dividends or interventions into
labour markets. The positive welfare effects of liberalization
arise from a reallocation of resources following a shift in rel-
ative prices including the wage rate. Any attempt to maintain a
privileged income position of workers in the hitherto protected
sector of the economy endangers the establishment and growth of
internationally competitive activities and prevents the creation
of additional productive jobs. Governments may find it difficult
to resist the claim of organized labour to secure, if not in-
A relaxation of banking regulations requires, of course, to
adopt anti-inflationary policies lowering the government's
dependence on the inflation tax. This interrelationship high-
lights, again, the crucial interdependence of trade, monetary,
and credit policies.- 21 -
crease, real wages, but this political pressure will relax only
when the employment^and-^lncome effects of liberalization materi-
e.; and this will happen the sooner real wages are allowed to
decline temporarily until productivity gains accruing from a
better resource allocation permit further wage increases.
III-4. Timing and Sequencing of Liberalization
An abrupt liberalization would be the least painful way of
proceeding if the following conditions are given: Firstly, with
the new system of incentives firmly in place, adjustment will
proceed rapidly without being hampered by resource misallocation
during the transition. Secondly, instantaneous adjustment will
prevent political opposition to the policy change from diluting
it. And thirdly, an immediate transformation of the economic
environment will reduce uncertainty about the credibility of the
policy initiative which could delay the response of economic
agents to new incentives. If these considerations are overriding,
the issues of timing and sequencing do not arise.
There is a wide-spread belief, however, that instantaneous
liberalization of an economy hitherto subjected to exchange con-
trol, import licencing, negative real interest rates, indexed
real wages, and so on, will completely disrupt economic activi-
ties and cause high adjustment costs in terms of declining output
and increasing unemployment. It is then suggested to remove con-
trols gradually so as to give economic agents time to prepare for- 22 -
adjustment (timing) and to deregulate individual markets in a
stepwise fashion depending on the ease with which adjustment can
be accomplished in these markets (sequencing).
Some of these problems have already been discussed above
with respect to import liberalization and exchange rate policy.
Analytically, an optimal liberalization program depends on the
degree of prevailing interventions, on the intensity of linkages
between individual markets (i.e. the level of economic develop-
ment) and on expectations which have been built up on the basis
of past experience with economic policy making [Lachler, 1985].
Although all these factors do matter, very little is known con-
cerning their precise relationship to the time schedule of a
reform program. Therefore, the basis for any proposal remains
largely judgmental. The advantages of graduation in import li-
beralization have been emphasized on the grounds that losses of
capital and jobs, inevitable as they are in the process of moving
towards a new production structure, would be minimized . Whether
this can be achieved depends on the success of exchange rate
policy in shifting relative prices in favour of exportables with-
out propelling domestic inflation.
Similarly, gradualism has been advocated with respect to stab-
ilization policy [Stein, 1980]. The main argument here is that
unwinding inflation in smaller steps can avoid a head-on-colli-
sion between monetary policy and price and wage determination
which would result in a major economic recession. However, in a
high inflation environment, any fine tuning of monetary pol-
icies may be impossible and gradual stabilization may be insuf-
ficient to break the inflation mentality. The experience of
Germany in the early 1920s and that of Austria, Hungary and
Poland in the late 1940s show furthermore that a shock treat-
ment can achieve stabilization quickly and at low cost in terms
of unemployment [Sargent, 1982],- 23 -
Concerning the proper sequence of liberalization steps Jakob
Frenkel [19 84] has argued that domestic distortions in the goods
and asset markets should be removed before links with the rest of
the world are liberalized. In addition, restrictions on capital
flows should onlY^^e^li^tje^d.^aJfjber^free trade has been introduced
because asset markets are adjusting more quickly to new policy
regimes than goods markets. The latter proposal also emerges from
several studies of unsuccessful liberalization attempts in Chile,
Uruguay, and Argentina [McKinnon, 1982; Dornbusch, 1984; Edwards,
1984; Sjaastad, 1984]. They all conclude that liberalization of
the capital account should be postponed because capital flows
would either - under a freely floating exchange rate - push the
value of the domestic currency to a level which impedes the
structural transition of the real sector, or - under a "tablita"
or fixed exchange rate regime - require extremely high real rates
of interest in domestic capital markets to maintain the chosen
parity .
Both effects are clearly undesirable but we wojuld argue that
they have rather resulted from ain^ JLnjgonsJLsjtent mix of exchange
rate and domestic economic policies _than^from the ^Liberalization
of the capital account as such. In particular, the attempt to use
the exchange rate as an anti-inflationary device while distor-
tions of domestic capital and goods markets remained in place,
has caused the severe economic recessions which each time marked
For similar reasons the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 focus-
sed on trade liberalization and did not envisage the elimina-
tion of restrictions on capital flows.- 24 -
the end of so-called economic liberalization in Latin America.
Even if controls on capital flows had been maintained the ex-
change rate regime managed by the government would still have in-
duced an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The resulting
decline in the international competitiveness of the tradeables
sector which was enforced by incompatible domestic policies such
as wage indexation (Chile) or persistent monetary expansion (Ar-
gentina) , would have been sufficient to prevent the necessary
adjustment of the real sector of the economy and, thus, to pro-
voke a new balance-of-payments crisis. Most likely, the risks
associated with the choice of a "wrong" exchange rate are by no
means smaller than those stemming from destabilizing capital
flows.
This assessment suggests that appropriate liberalization
policies for concrete cases can only be proposed after a careful
economic analysis of the country concerned was undertaken. With
this qualification in mind, the history of successful liberaliza-
tion in Asian countries and less successful liberalization at-
tempts in Latin America's Southern Cone (to which we shall return
in detail later) would at least suggest the following policy
guidelines. Gradualism tends to be self-defeating with respect to
stabilization and exchange rate policies, while import and cap-
ital markets may be better candidates, for a more cautious removal
of controls. It has to be stressed, however, that at least a
partial deregulation of the capital market is an urgent task
since capital markets have to play a key role in providing the
funds needed for rapid and successful economic adjustment to a- 25 -
more outward oriented trade regime. To facilitate financial
flows, it may also be advisable in many countries not to postpone
the liberalization of the capital account until the real sector
of the economy has adjusted, even if there are some risks con-
cerning an unwarranted appreciation of the currency. If the gov-
ernment abstains from interventions into the foreign exchange
market, i.e. does not buy up the foreign exchange inflow, a re-
valuation of the currency is unlikely. A steady course of the
Central Bank with respect to monetary policies can prevent an
inflationary increase of domestic money supply, while import
liberalization will help to mitigate the revaluationary effect of
capital inflows. The government should be prepared to accept a
temporary deficit in the current account (j-curve effect) to
accelerate productive investment based on imported capital goods
and to limit the inflow of speculative capital. Once new invest-
ments go into operation and export growth is accelerating, the
current account deficit will automatically be eliminated.
III-5. The Political Economy of Export Liberalization
Despite some open questions, the switch from an inward to an
outward oriented trade regime has hardly been hampered by a lack
of knowledge concerning the economic management of transition; it
was rather impeded by a lack of political will to change the
direction of economic development. The major problem with liber-
alization is that government officials, politicians and the in-
formed public can readily foresee those interests that are likely- 26 -
to be damaged in the short run by any liberalization effort. The
damage accrues primarily to those benefitting most from controls
and regulations, and it is in the logic of the system that the
main beneficiaries of the regime such as import-substituting
industries, the labour aristocracy and bureaucrats issuing power
through controls also tend to be well organized in political
pressure groups. For them, it pays to invest into the continuity
of the inward oriented trade regime. Those, on the other hand,
who have to foot the bill for excessive regulations in terms of
income and employment foregone, such as consumers, informal la-
bour, export industries and agriculture, often do not realize the
price they are paying and, hence, have little incentive to orga-
nize themselves in special interest groups. They usually find it
difficult as well to perceive the medium and long term benefits
that export liberalization holds out to them. For these reaons,
there has always been a lot of opposition against and little
support for a change of the trade regime.
Yet, not just the so-called "Gang of Four" in Asia (Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) but also quite a number
of other developing countries have adopted export promotion
strategies in the 1960s and 1970s. This raises the question which
political conditions may be conducive to liberalization. Bhagwati
[1985:Chapter 1] has hypothesized that authoritarian regimes can
more easily choose appropriate policies than democratic govern-
ments. His main argument is that the import-substitution strategy
confers more political power than the export promotion strategy
since it provides politicians with greater patronage; hence where- 27 -
politicians take power directly by authoritarian means, they have
no necessity to use the economic system to generate and exercise
power, thus freeing themselves to embrace economic liberaliza-
tion. Though analytically appealing, Bhagwati's hypothesis does
not carry very far in the light of empirical evidence. There are
military dictatorships in some Latin American countries clinging
to populist policies while politicians in fairly democratic coun-
tries such as Malaysia or Thailand have taken the initiative to
liberalize their economies in the 1970s.
So far, we do in fact know very little about the political-
economic background.: of economic .decisipnj-making; -in .developing
countrie s Ka. nd_ ^p n , jthe, con s te11a t i on p f _ p p we r, g r oup s which -. pro y i de
governments with enough, independence to implement appropriate
policies for sustained economic development. Much more research
is needed in this area. All that can be said at this stage is
that standard arguments against the political feasibility of
export liberalization did not stand a test. The attempt to pre-
serve national independence through a diversified domestic indus-
trial sector, largely de-linked from the world economy, has in-
creased dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods and
has contributed to the currently intractable foreign indebted-
ness. Trade unions were not pacified by maintaining the course of
import-substitution strategies; the political pressure exerted by
organized labour against the government was as strong under in-
ward-oriented trade regimes as when liberalization was attempted.
And finally, persistent reliance on import-substitution strate-
gies for fear of political and social upheavals in case of a- 28 -
policy change has not protected many countries in Africa and
Latin America from plunging into economic crises and civil dis-
order with a subsequent change of government. The new government,
often a military one, then had little choice but to implement
some liberalization measures to remedy the economic crisis.
IV. Evaluation of the Evidence
IV-1. Export Performance
The proposition that an open trading environment promotes an
efficient use of available resources has received impressive
support from the experience of an increasing number of old and
new NICs which gradually opened their markets during the 1960s
and 1970s. Export liberalization has caused manufactured exports
from the Third World to expand spectacularly, outpacing both
world trade expansion and domestic industrial output growth. As
Table 1 shows, manufactured exports of developing countries grew
on average at an annual rate of roughly 14 per cent in real terms
in the period 1965-1982, i.e. about twice as fast as world trade.
Export expansion was predominantly carried by the 19 countries
listed in Table 1 which accounted for 79 per cent of total Third
World manufactured exports in 1982. With rapid domestic industri-
alization, the export portfolio of these countries significantly
shifted towards manufactured goods as shown by the shares of
these goods in total exports which increased from 7.2 per cent in
1965 to 44.8 per cent in 1982.- 29 -
Table 1 - Manufactured Exports of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), 1965-1982
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Sources: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, New
York, various issues. - UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, Department of International Economic and Social
Affairs, Statistical Papers, New York, various issues. - UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, New York, various issues. - UNCTAD, Handbook
of International Trade and Development Statistics, New York 1983; Supplement 1984. -Estadisticas de Expor-
taci6n hasta 1969, Banco Industrial del Peru, Division de Ccmmercio Exterior, Lima 1971. - Analisis Esta-
distico, Importacion - Exportacion, Centro de Estadisticas Nacionales y Comercio Internacional Edicion no. 17,
Montevideo 1973. - Economic Survey of Singapore 1983, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic of Singapore. -
Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1979/80, Chief Statistician Department of Statistics, Singapore. - The Trade
of China (Taiwan District) 1982, Compiled and published by the Statistical Department Inspectorate General of
Customs, Taipei, Taiwan, The Republic of China, Chinese Maritime Customs, Statistical Series No. 1, 1983. -
Economic Survey 1982-83, Government of India, printed by the Manager, Govt. of India Press, New Delhi 1984.- 30 -
The 19 countries in Table 1 are quite diverse as there are
some - the first generation NICs - which had established a sub-
stantial industrial base already in 1965, while others - the
second generation NICs - were latecomers which began to promote
industrialization and exports of manufactures only in the 1970s.
The interesting point to make is that this happens in spite of
successive oil shocks, economic recession in industrialized coun-
tries, high interest rates and new protectionism during the last
decade. The unfavourable external environment did not prevent
these countries from penetrating markets of industrialized coun-
tries further and from intensifying trade within the Third World.
The real rate of manufactured export growth of 10.1 per cent for
all countries taken together, which has to be compared to a rate
of 4.5 per cent for world trade in manufactures, indicates the
continuity of export success in the period 1973-82. In this dif-
ficult period, the second generation NICs were even more success-
ful than their forerunners as shown by rates of export expansion
of 14.6 and 9.6 per cent respectively.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that the early export drive
of old NICs has not clogged the markets of industrialized coun-
tries, leaving hardly any room for latecomers, as it often as-
serted. Most of the new NICs started industrialization based on a
relatively open trade regime in the 1970s and were able to com-
pete successfully with old NICs and with suppliers from indus-
trialized countries. All second generation NICs except Colombia
(which had abandoned outward orientation by then) have achieved
rates of manufactured export expansion in excess of the group of- 31 -
old NICs [for further details, see Havrylyshyn, Alikhani, 1982].
An analysis of ASEAN countries [Hiemenz, 1984] even suggests that
the take-off to export oriented industrialization may have been
easier for the latecomers since the experience of the old NICs
served as an indication for choosing an appropriate product mix,
taping the right markets and exploiting established trade links.
A great number of country studies show that exports, which
expanded so rapidly under outward-oriented trade regimes, have
been the major driving force of economic growth and employment
creation, exceeding any performance observed in countries pursu-
ing import-substitution strategies [Donges, 1983, and the refer-
ences given there; Ram, 1984], The domestic saving rate increased
rapidly and so did the proportion of investment in GDP, both
behind remarkable rises in the export-to-GDP ratios (Table 2) .
What in most NICs appears as an "export-led type" of economic
development, in fact meant a continuous strengthening of the
supply potential of the economy and a steady increase in produc-
tivity. Relatively low real wages provided the inducement to
build up manufacturing production capacities using labour-inten-
sive technologies to a large extent, which allowed the absorption
of surplus labour. When later on labour became scarcer during the
industrialization process and consequently real wages increased
more rapidly, particularly in the leading NICs, the economies had
gained sufficient flexibility on the supply side to gradually
shift the production structure towards more physical-capital and
skill-intensive activities and to be internationally competitive
with the new undertakings. Direct foreign investment has contrib-- 32 -
Table 2 - Indicators of Export-oriented Development
Countries
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Developing Member Countries of ADB, Vol. 15, April 1984.- 33 -
uted to the success of export orientation and diversification,
mainly by providing technical knowledge and marketing expertise
and by upgrading skills of domestic workers as well; but with the
exception of Singapore the significance of (totally or partly)
foreign-owned firms, in terms of investment, production, export
or employment shares, was much more modest than commonly believ-
ed.
The empirical evidence also confirms that these encouraging
results have been brought about by improvements of trade and
trade-related policies along the lines discussed in Section III.
A corrected and more sensible import-tariff and export-subsidy
policy, combined with more realistically valued real exchange
rates, more rational factor pricing, and less intervention in
goods markets have constituted the pillars of outward-orientated
trade regimes. State intervention remained important in all NICs
(with the exception of Hong Kong which always has come very close
to a "laissez-faire" economy), but the readiness of governments
to consider comparative-cost criteria, to modify plans when cir-
cumstances changed and to learn from past mistakes was much
greater than elsewhere in the Third World. When export liberal-
ization involved some kind of resource misallocation, for in-
stance because the governments promoted exports which were bear-
ing high marginal domestic resource costs per unit of foreign-
exchange earnings, the country's industrialization process did
not come up against a balance-of-payments constraint, as it
almost inevitably would under an inward-oriented regime; those- 34 -
exports at least provided foreign-exchange revenues. It should
also be noted that the transition from an inward-oriented to an
outward-oriented trade regime did nowhere cause traumatic dis-
locations in production and employment. On the contrary, the more
or less gradual approach adopted by the governments in reforming
policies facilitated the needed adaptation greatly. Even many of
the inefficient producers which so comfortably lived under the
previous protectionist environment, demonstrated that they were
actually quite able to reduce costs through process innovations
and to develop new markets through product innovations, once the
increased competitive pressures made such efforts imperative for
survival.
IV-2. External Shocks and Foreign Indebtedness
One frequently raised objection against export liberaliza-
tion concerns the dependence of outward-oriented economies on
conditions in world markets. It is argued that open economies are
vulnerable to external shocks while less trade orientation pro-
vides a protective shield against disruptive external demand or
price changes. The experience of the 1970s and 1980s, when all
developing countries were suddenly confronted with the need to
overcome increasing balance-of-payments pressures in order to
preserve the momentum of their development process, reveals the
opposite. Outward oriented economies commanded enough flexibility
both at the macro and micro level to meet the challenge of dete-
riorating world market conditions without falling into the debt- 35 -
trap, while inward oriented economies suffered from severe econo-
mic depression and - in many cases - mounting foreign indebted-
ness. Balassa [1984] has shown that outward-oriented economies
relied largely on output-increasing policies of export promotion
and import substitution to offset the balance-of-payments effects
of external shocks in the 1974-76 and the 1979-81 periods and
accepted a temporary decline in the rate of economic growth in
order to limit their external indebtedness. In turn, inward-ori-
ented economies failed to apply output-increasing policies of
adjustment; they financed the balance-of-payments effects of
external shocks by foreign borrowing in the 1974-76 period and
had to take deflationary measures in 1979-81 as their increased
indebtedness limited the possibilities for further borrowing. The
policies applied led to economic growth rates substantially high-
er in outward-oriented than in inward-oriented economies, with
the differences in growth rates offsetting the differences in the
size of external shocks several times.
IV-3. Aborted Liberalization Attempts in Latin America
The liberalization attempts in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina,
initiated in the mid-1970s [for details see the country papers in
Barletta, Blejer, Landau, 1984], seem to run counter the
arguments presented in previous sections. True, all three econo-
mies experienced initial success in reducing inflation and
accelerating the rate of economic growth. But the positive- 36 -
developments ended abrupty, as each country encountered a sudden
economic downturn, large increases in external indebtedness, and
internal financial crises.
Closer examination ofi the experience of these countries
underlines the extreme importance of internal consistency in the
policy package implemented to liberalize the economy. In particu-
lar, a fixed exchange rate system pegged against an appreciative
currency (the US dollar) turned out to be incompatible with fis-
cal, monetary and wage policies. In the Chilean economy, the
momentum of economic development achieved by trade liberalization
and anti-inflationary budget policies broke down when the ex-
change rate was fixed against the US dollar in 1979. A sharply
appreciating real exchange rate in 1980-81 combined with a con-
siderable rise in real wages (due to wage indexation to past, and
higher, inflation rates) and with persistently high interest
rates (due to bank regulations causing substantial arbitrage
costs) could not but erode the international competitiveness of
the tradables sector and provide strong incentives for specula-
tive investment (mostly in construction activities). A lack of
consistency between exchange rate policy and trade policies as
well as fiscal policies has also caused the failure of economic
liberalization in Argentina. In this country, a "tablita" was
implemented with a concomitant opening of the capital account
while protectionist trade interventions remained untouched and
large fiscal deficits continued to fuel domestic inflation. This
combination of contradictory policies has put the trade sector
under untenable pressure - as in the case of Chile - and gave- 37 -
rise to an unprecedented outflow of domestic capital. Both coun-
tries accumulated staggering levels of foreign debt within a
relatively short period of time as a result of unresolved bal-
ance-of-payments problems.
These partial deregulation attempts can clearly not be used
as examples against export liberalization based on a package of
stabilization-cum-restructuring policies as suggested in Section
II and applied in most of the second generation NICs. However,
they do provide lessons with respect to the crucial link between
exchange rate, interest rate, and wages, and with respect to the
disastrous consequences of step-by-step approaches to liberaliza-
tion. Sjaastad [1983:19] made the point unequivocally: "..., the
fatal flaw is not to be found in the liberalisation programme per
se, but rather in policy inconsistencies. Policy inconsistencies
are of minor importance when markets are heavily regulated. Free
markets, however, require a high degree of policy coherence."
V. World Market Conditions - Obstacle to Export Liberalization?
The previous analysis has stressed that the main factors
determining the success of outward-oriented economic development
are to be found on the supply side of the economy. To be sure,
world market conditions also matter and when they are as favour-
able as they were in the 1950s and 1960s, the chances for accom-
plishing a successful transition to an open trade regime are
particularly good. But even a buoyant external demand can only be- 38 -
transformed into an impetus to economic development if there is
an adequate export potential. Nevertheless, scepticism holds on
and fuels new variants of export pessimism which rest on the
assumption that the revival of protectionism will further re-
strict access to markets of industrialized countries, that these
markets cannot absorb expanding exports from a large number of
developing countries, and that world demand will remain sluggish
due to a weak economic performance of industrialized countries.
Though "new protectionism" in industrial countries has not
completely eroded the gains from earlier rounds of trade libera-
lization [Hughes, Waelbroeck, 1981:131] and has not prevented
export-oriented economies (in particular the East Asian NICs)
from penetrating foreign markets, the danger is that it generate
additional uncertainty among investors in developing countries
concerning engagement in export-oriented activities. Investors
may then turn to presumably "safe" investment opportunities
geared towards production for local markets, and political forces
favouring an import-substitution type of economic development may
succeed in forestalling or at least slowing down any attempt to
liberalize the system of economic incentives. In this sense,
protectionists in the industrial countries play into the hands of
protectionists in developing countries.
As to the proposition, that it will be impossible for all
developing countries to emulate success stories, because the re-
sulting surge of manufactured exports to Western markets would- 39 -
cause a glut on these markets and provoke further protectionist
tendencies [Cline, 1982; Spraos, 1983:140], it reflects a fal-
lacy-of-composition. When moving in the direction of market li-
beralization, it takes a longer time for large, natural resource-
rich countries, e.g. in Latin America, starting from a higher
level of distortions, to arrive at the same manufactured export
share in GDP than for small, labour-abundant countries of the
Asian type. It would be even more likely that manufactured export
shares in the former group would always fall behind those in the
latter group, even at the same population and income levels. Nor
would all developing countries export the same products, given
differences in resource endowments and skills. Even in the la-
bour-intensive segment of the product range, there is a wide
variety of manufactures developing countries can specialize in,
and for most of these products market penetration is rather mar-
ginal in industrialized countries. Moreover, the implementation
of an outward-oriented trade regime would provide for some degree
of import liberalization. This offers the chance to expand South-
South trade along with South-North trade, in particular with
labour-intensive and standardized capital-intensive products. And
finally, should too many developing countries specialize in the
same products for exporting, their terms of trade would deter-
iorate (other things being equal) . But this can be only a tem-
porary effect because it is unreasonable to assume that investors
and exporters do not learn. Most likely, they will react to de-
clining prices by changing the product mix.- 40 -
As to export pessimism derived from slow economic growth in
developed countries, it should be emphasized that for industrial-
izing developing countries there is not a stringent and invar-
iable link between the rate of expansion of world demand and that
of exports [Riedel, 1984].-The composition of output changes and
so does the structure of exports. In fact, the changing composi-
tion of exports was the major reason behind rapid export expan-
sion of developing countries over the past 25 years. Third World
manufactured exports grew twice as fast as real GDP in industri-
alized countries in the 1960s and more than four times faster
after 1973 when industrialized countries experienced successive
economic recessions.
VI. Conclusion
This essay has reviewed the arguments and the empirical
evidence for the superiority of an outward-oriented trade regime
in promoting industrialization and accelerating economic develop-
ment. Trade policies which do not discriminate between local and
foreign sales improve allocative efficiency and provide dynamic
gains from economies of scale, an enhanced transfer of technolo-
gy, and better access to international financial markets. Beyond
outward-oriented trade policies, internal liberalization of mar-
kets increase the flexibility of the economy, which is one neces-
sary condition for successful economic development. These advant-
ages accrue even in an international economic environment less
favourable than that of the 1960s and early 1970s. It is, how-- 41 -
ever, of crucial importance that a high degree of coherence be-
tween trade liberalization and related policies is achieved, that
the policies are credible, and that they are implemented
rigorously.- 42 -
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